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Résumé: Cet article s'intéresse à la mise en  place de l'approche dite du "Balanced
Scorecards" dans des unités opérationnelles plutôt qu'au niveau d'une
direction générale. Il s'appuie sur une étude de cas. On propose de traiter les
questions relatives à la coordination, à la fixation des objectifs et au contrôle
en s'appuyant sur une méthodologie originale pour construire le modèle
d'interaction entre les différentes entités de l'organisation. Cette méthodologie
fait une part importante à l'apprentissage organisationnel permettant ainsi une
compréhension mutuelle des degrés de liberté individuels et une meilleure
observation réciproque. Cette approche "horizontale" est mieux adaptée à ce
type de contexte que l'approche "verticale" plus traditionnelle du BCS.
Abstract: This paper discusses the implementation of Balanced Scorecards. A specific
approach is suggested to emphasize organizational learning in the model
building process. This approach is well suited for the middle management
level as illustrated by a detailed case study. At that level mutual understanding
reinforces co-ordination while mutual observability reinforces individual
incentives. As such this paper provides an interesting counterpart to the more
traditional top down vertical approach of BSC in which model building is
viewed as a way to link global and local objectives.
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21. Introduction (Key issues)
In a 1992 article published in the Harvard Business Review1, Kaplan and Norton
(henceforth KN) presented a new framework for corporate control systems. They called
it the Balanced Scorecard2 (henceforth BSC). This approach is considered by Anglo-
Saxon literature as one of the most significant managerial innovations of the past decade
(Ittner and Larcker, 1998). It received a lot of academic attention (Butler et al., 1997;
Atkinson et al., 1997, Mooraj et al., 1999; Norrekilt, 2000) as well as a largely positive
answer from companies (a recent survey estimates that 60 percent of Fortune 1000 firms
have experimented with the BSC, Silk 1998).
BSC was developed in response to criticisms of traditional management systems. These
had been based on the twinning of operational management (focused on physical
indicators and on short-term local improvements) with accountancy-based (and
therefore fundamentally past-oriented) financial management (Johnson and Kaplan,
1987).
The originality of BSC, as proclaimed by its supporters, related to two fundamental
principles: the multidimensional nature of performance, measured over a whole set of
indicators that were combined into four separate perspectives (financial; customers;
internal processes; innovation and learning); and the existence of an underlying model
linking the various indicators to one another.
In their pre-2000 writings, KN did not describe their know-how for eliciting a model of
cause and effect. Moreover they did not say how the model was used and what were the
consequences of BSC on target setting, remuneration or monitoring procedures (Otley,
1999; Lipe and Salterio, 2000).
3Empirical research emphasises the design of the cause-effect model as the critical
question for the implementation of BSC (Ahn, 2001). In fact many issues related to the
design and the use of the model remain opened and seem particularly unclear in practice
(Malmi, 2001).
In their latest work (Kaplan and Norton, 2001), KN tried to tackle these issues through
the use of around 20 examples of BSC implementation - the approaches that had been
followed, and the benefits thereof.
The major conclusions to be drawn from this latest book were that:
- BSC is an attempt to strengthen collective learning about the conditions in which a
certain level of performance might be achieved
- BSC’s effects are more significant when individual pay packages are linked to it.
- BSC must be broken down at the lower hierarchical levels
On the first point, KN underlined the role of the model of cause and effect, of which
they gave detailed examples. Through these examples, they gave some details on how
this model helps learning by top management on the relevance of the strategy. But its
impact on the collective dimension of learning remains unclear: they only make the
assumption that a better communication of the strategy will lead the employees to be
more involved.
On the two other points, KN provided some details on the link between BSC and
remuneration at the business unit level but not at lower hierarchical levels. Their main
observation was that BSC-related bonuses are usually related to collective targets. KN
briefly discussed the problem of free riding. In their opinion, it was possible that this
problem had been overestimated, and in any event other mechanisms such as peer
4control dampened its effects wherever colleagues were able to observe each other' s
efforts.
We can therefore summarise the control proposition that the Balanced Scorecard
approach contains in the following manner:
- global objectives are broken down into local objectives as long as the interactions
between the local entities involved are not too strong, and if models can be
established linking local objectives to global objectives
- wherever it is difficult to break local indicators down into their components due to
an excessive interconnection of individual actions (i.e., wherever co-ordination
problems are significant), control can be enacted via incentives that are related to
shared objectives.
- Collective learning is improved by a better communication of the strategy.
In our opinion, the ability to define individual objectives (as a basis for setting
remuneration) and to ensure that they will allow collective learning remains an
important issue in environments marked by significant co-ordination problems. In fact,
it is often in such environments that people are least able to attenuate the effects of free
riding (i.e., via pressure from one's peers).
The purpose of the present paper is to advance in this direction. It draws from the
implementation experience of a major international cement company to elaborate a
reformulation of the BSC approach, specifically addressing the collective learning issue
in complex environments. This management experience consisted of renovating the
existing tableaux de bord battery of performance indicators in order to improve
operational control. It did not involve rebuilding all of the firm's control systems. In this
instance, the BSC approach continued to be a crucial benchmark (in the sense that the
5new performance indicators did incorporate new dimensions). Inversely, the intellectual
affiliation with a rejuvenated system of management control made it possible to devise
practical responses to the issue of individual objectives – and it achieved this by
pursuing a different approach to the building of a performance model (Chassang, 1987).
This case leads us to come up with a reformulation of the BSC approach. Our
proposition is a translation of two fundamental ideas. The first is inherent to a French
context but may apply as well in other non Anglo-Saxon environments. In this type of
environment, there is a need to capitalise on the "tableau de bord" (battery of
performance indicators) concept that so many companies have been developing since
the 1950s (Gray and Pesqueux, 1993; Chiapello and Delmond, 1994; Lebas, 1994).
Several authors have focused on the proximity and differences between this sort of
approach and a BSC one (Bourguigon et al., 2001), particularly as pertains to the
multidimensional nature of performance measurement (Epstein and Manzoni, 1998).
In addition, the second idea, which has a wide applicability, is that management control
has advanced in steps with other new forms of piloting - forms that emphasise a re-
forecasting of targets rather than the analysis of variances, and which stress horizontal
inter-departmental co-ordination rather than the attainment of local objectives (c.f.,
Chassang, 1987, but also all of the literature that has come out on the "Japanese school
of management"3). Ignoring these advances makes it difficult to establish a new
operational system within a firm. These new orientations prefer to focus the design of
new procedures (Just-in-Time, project management) rather than on the development of
models. The proposed reformulation intends to fully integrate these two business facts
in the BSC: the pre-existence of tableaux de bord and the emphasis on the design of
procedures.
6Capitalising from this experience, we offer a reformulation of the BSC approach. The
major novelty associated to this reformulation concerns the elaboration of models. KN
developed in their latest book several models of cause and effect to explain the various
performance indicators. They do not address the question of what process is involved in
developing such models. However, they do support the idea that the models are being
devised by executive committees. KN offer an a priori "template-shaped" causal model.
This aspect has been the target of severe criticism, notably from Norreklit, 2000.
Our reformulation makes possible another elaboration - one that is capable of devising a
performance model which will rely more on management procedures than on ex ante
thought processes. As a matter of fact, it associates both a "top-down" and a "bottom
up" approach.
The present paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the main orientations of a
BSC approach (2). We then present our own methodology (3), and subsequently the
case in which we participated (4). We then offer an analytical framework that
summarises the main elements in the suggested reformulation and its principal
differences with BSC (5). In conclusion, we discuss how this reformulation constitutes a
reply to BSC as regards general issues of control.
2. The Balanced Scorecard
2.1  Diagnostics
According to KN, large firms experience changes that take them ever further away from
a system of mass production, and which bring them ever closer to a system that is based
on the production of a wide range of products and services. The combination of
7management systems and financial and global systems, on the one hand, with physical
and decentralised systems, on the other hand, produces a dichotomy that may have been
suitable for a system of mass production, but which is a definite handicap given current
trends. It used to be enough to monitor whether things were improving over time at a
local level. Nowadays internal co-ordination mechanisms need to be anticipated and
rapidly reconfigured. Financial indicators without any other backup constitute alarm
signals that often sound too late. They should therefore be combined with other more
strategic indicators in order to enable a timely analysis and interpretation of the firm's
true situation.
KN suggest combining these other indicators, necessary as they are to a proper
understanding of the current situation, into three categories: commercial; internal
processes; and innovation and learning. These three categories are then associated with
the financial category to constitute the unit's tableau de bord battery of performance
indicators. The first thing that each of these categories has to do is identify a series of
generic levers. This replicates ROI’s breakdown into several well-known levers (price,
product mix, working capital needs, etc.), but the approach does provide something
new, specifically the linkages that its authors try to build between the four categories.
Whereas large firms are traditionally comprised of departments that have each
developed their own expertise and performance evaluation systems, BSC's ambition is
to provide an opportunity for rethinking internal co-ordination on the basis of collective
challenges.
KN’s explanation for the innovation and learning category stresses this ambition. In an
increasingly international world where comparative advantages are more of a goal than
a given, human capital is a key factor of success in the top performing firms. As such,
8there needs to be a constant questioning of firms' ability to learn: the selection and
retention of the best staff; the mastery of information technology; and at a wider level,
the efficiency of the organisation’s tools and procedures - these are all generic topics
that need to be broken down according to the specific levers that have been identified in
the three other categories.
2.2 KN’s suggestion: a top-down approach4
The authors provide details of several other examples of implementation (1996b, pp.
78-79 and 2001). The principles contained therein are as follows:
1. BSC design (" Translating strategy into operational terms")
- clarifying the unit's strategy by interviewing its main senior managers
- formalising the anticipated outcomes of this strategy along the lines of the 4 main
axes that are being followed by the BSC
- choosing 4 or 5 key indicators for each axis
- designing a synthetic model to interconnect the various potential strategies
- choosing a specific strategic orientation - and quantifying it thanks to the model
2. BSC implementation
- "mobilising change through executive leadership”
-  turning strategy into a continuous process: integrating BSC into the planning
procedures (plan and budget); breaking the orientation that has been chosen down
throughout the organisation through an updating of the current information systems
("new executive information system")
- "making strategy everyone’s everyday job": breaking the BSC down at the lower
hierarchical levels: adapting the remuneration system
9- "aligning the organisation to the strategy"
To facilitate the BSC's installation, the authors recommend capitalising upon a
particular issue that is related to the firm's own specific circumstances. This can for
example involve a decentralisation project within a given structure, or else the
incorporation of inter-unit synergies. By integrating an issue of this nature into the
overall BSC implementation approach, it should become possible to build the new
practices into the regular procedures and encourage actors to adhere to them (rather than
causing rejection at the intermediary level, which often associates BSC with a new
managerial scheme that is costly in terms of time and information systems).
Two points deserve attention in the examples they give: the role of the model of cause
and effect; how the BSC is broken down at the lower hierarchical levels and the
remuneration system adapted.
On the role of the model, they provide some example on how the model can be used to
learn about the relevance of the strategy. Sears for instance tested statistically the
assumption of the causal link between the satisfaction of the employees, of the customer
and of the investors on which the strategy was based. However, they do not explain how
the employees at all levels will contribute to the learning. They only argue that the
model improves the communication of the strategy, which leads to a better
understanding by the employees. They thus understand better the link between their
action on the one hand and the strategic objectives and the performance of the company
on the otheri and would be more induced to discuss the strategy or suggest
improvements.
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On the second point, examples are given of companies that broke the BSC down the
hierarchical ladder. At the City of Charlotte’s department of Transportation, for
instance, all the priority programs are evaluated on their impact on the BSC measures of
the City (KN, 2001, p.237-239). In the case of the Exploration group of a large oil
company a personal scorecard has been created for each person in the organisation. This
card contains three levels of information: corporate objectives and measures, translation
of the corporate goals into business unit goals, and five personal objectives to which a
target is associated (KN, 2001, p.244-245).
Other examples are given of compensation systems: in one Mobil’s business unit, 250$
have been given to each employee because the target on four among five BSC
objectives at BU’s level had been reached (KN, 2001, p.235-236). At CIGNA Property
and Casualty, the bonus is determined by a number of “shares” multiplied by a price per
share. The number of shares is based on individual performance, but we do not know
how it is measured, and the price based on targets on the BSC of the BU (p.259-260).
Other examples show that at Business Unit level, the compensation of the executives is
often linked to personal, BU and corporate objectives based on the BSC.
But no example describes how compensation at lower hierarchical levels is linked to
personal objectives based on a personal BSC. In the two cases where there are BSC at
personal level and compensation system is described (namely Novia Scotia Power and
Mobil NAM&Rs), the compensation of employees are based on corporate, division and
BU’s performance but not on personal performance. It is thus unclear what use is made
of the personal targets in the evaluation of these managers.
The problem of narrow and functional thinking that KN (2001, p.233) associate with
traditional systems of management by objective seems thus solved by collective
11
incentives. But as we mentioned in the introduction, though in some cases the pressure
from one’s peers or the emergency of company’s situation can attenuate free rider
problem, in many other cases this problem remains and one has to look for other more
elaborated solutions to provide individual incentives.
3. Methodology
The general framework for the present study is a thought-action cycle. New
management tools, based on existing theories and practices, are suggested and then
implemented. This implementation should in return enable an enriching of the initial
ideas and theories, that is, of the thinking upon which the tools had been based. Kaplan
(1998) conceptualized this methodological process, calling it innovation action research.
In the present paper, we will primarily be deriving meaning from the attempt to
implement a new management control procedure throughout an industrial group’s
different SBU’s. This approach expands upon other research that has been done on the
role that models play in management control (Ponssard and Tanguy, 1993).
We shall therefore be deriving meaning from a specific experience. Yin (1984),
Eisenhardt (1989), and more recently Langley (1999), working with the theory of
processes have highlighted the suitability of developing theory on the basis of particular
examples. To be precise, we will be delving into the organizational modifications that
are the result of a management tool’s implementation. As such, the present research
project is an example of intervention research (Moisdon, 1984, Hatchuel and Molet,
1986).
Eisenhardt (1989) stressed that any research project that is based on specific case
histories runs the risk of creating theories which are too elaborate, given that they
12
comprise an attempt to explain a highly detailed situation. To overcome this deficiency,
it may be appropriate to avoid describing the case in great detail. We should be trying to
highlight those ideas that are crucial for theoretical thinking, and will therefore not seek
to specify with any great degree of precision the conditions in the given example in
which the proposed reengineering can be successful. We will however try to specify the
operational objectives of this reengineering, which the intervention proved to be
relevant. Given that this involves tools which are primarily designed from a rational
perspective, being interested only in the explanation of the implementation through
testing in the organization, is not only a necessary step, but also a difficult one to take.
From this point of view, we have been able to understand better the expected effects of
such a system by following its implementation in a context in which we knew well what
was at stake. Our analysis has been mainly inductive and even though it has been built
on the basis of one experience, it contains an intuitive component that cannot be
completely overlooked. (Weick, 1989). Moreover, Langley advocates this intuitive
component as useful (1999).
In addition, the educational case studies that we are devising can help to create a new
approach for the implementation of management tools. According to this approach,
management tools are not to be implemented in the traditional OR fashion but used as
rationality myths to structure a decentralized decision-making. Analysis of these cases
based on authors’ intervention will illustrate the approach and provide an interesting
starting point for its transposition into another context. This specific use of management
tools in organizations has been advocated in Ponssard (1994) as part of an
organizational learning process.
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The discussion of detailed case histories such as the one described in this paper is also
an important ingredient to focus theoretical thinking on relevant issues such as the
relationship between coordination and incentives in team management – a question that
is identified in the microeconomic theory of the firm, but that has not received much
attention (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992).
4. The example of a major cement company
The case with which we are concerned here relates to the cement-making units of a
major international group. The project head's mission statement mentioned two
objectives:
- " to have a shared information system for the more than 20 cement units that the
group operates across the world;
-  to design and implement a battery of performance indicators that will enable the
managers of these units and the different hierarchical echelons of the organisation to
dispose of key indicators which will allow them to measure their performance and to
better pilot our activities."
Behind these two operational objectives, one detects an interest in internal
benchmarking, a desire to reinforce the common culture (notably by facilitating the new
units’ integration), and more generally an attempt to capitalise upon existing know-how.
Two operational units were selected to take part in the project's design phase
(formulation of performance indicators, method of utilisation, etc.). The pilot committee
included the two operational heads from these two activities, a group level function
manager (in this case, the CFO is his role as head of information systems), and the
14
project manager, who was assisted by an outside consultant (the author of the present
article).
The actual carrying out of the project basically involved a mobilisation of the cement
units' internal resources. Between the project's conception and the beginning of its
implementation, two years elapsed.
Although the project was not talked about as if it were an implementation of a BSC
approach, this reference progressively became a useful way of conceptualising what was
happening (specifically during internal presentations). The BSC link was particularly
evident in light of the simultaneous integration into the indicators of elements that had
been previously analysed in an independent manner, or which had simply been
neglected (tracking of fiscal indicators, budget control, monitoring of safety and
environmental issues, following up on investments, etc.).
We will now focus on those aspects of the project that are directly related to our
discussion.
4.1 Aspects that are both top-down and bottom-up in nature
Such aspects can be illustrated through the way in which factory managers, on one
hand, and sales managers, on the other, used the battery of performance indicators.
 (i) As regards the factory managers, from the very beginning the approach basically
involved a bottom-up orientation. A subgroup comprising managers from two pilot
units was constituted with the mission of devising a common battery of performance
indicators. This task was largely facilitated by the existence of a function-level
management unit that was placed in charge of tracking cement performances (at the
factory level) - and thus by the existence of a battery of technical indicators for each of
the process's various phases. This made it possible to verify the validity of KN’s
15
diagnostics regarding the disconnection between the factories' technical piloting and
financial cost control (variations in the reporting cycles, absence of shared itemisations,
the operatives' relative lack of interest in "budget" control, the financiers’ lack of
knowledge as to operational issues, and more generally the gap between technical and
managerial cultures).
This phase dealt with two types of issues: integrating technical and financial tracking
procedures into a single and shared battery of performance indicators, it was also
supposed to convey a "top-down" element that had not been incorporated into existing
approaches and which related to the monitoring of the investments' profitability (factory
managers tend to fight amongst themselves to obtain investments that help them to
lower their direct costs without incorporating the cost of capital into their calculations).
With respect to this latter point, the simultaneously top-down and bottom-up nature of
the approach made it possible to come up with a formulation that was acceptable to
everybody and which could actually translate into synthetic EVA-type indicators (such
as return on invested capital).
 (ii) As regards the sales management units, from the very beginning the approach
basically involved a top-down orientation, due to the absence of any shared language
between units that were operating in highly different contexts (mature vs. growing
markets, various levels of vertical integration, differences in the relative importance of
the distribution segments, etc.) and which were not very used to communicating
internally on such topics. Here the piloting committee played a more direct role in
formulating general management's objectives in this area (the need for segmentation,
the need to know how the added costs’ structure was broken down, the return for each
client, market and factory, etc.). This made it possible to capitalise upon the unit that
16
had achieved the greatest progress with respect to these objectives - without neglecting
the need to leave some room for local specificities in the performance indicators’ final
version.
4.2 The replacement of existing procedures
General management was convinced that this approach was a valid one, but it had to be
sold out in the field to operatives who were not necessarily favourably disposed towards
it ("yet another programme the Group has dreamed up without thinking about our
needs.").
The project head's attitude consisted of demonstrating how the battery of indicators that
were being proposed could be seen as an improvement on the existing system.
Although they were not a perfect reflection of existing organisational structures (which
can vary from one unit to the next), the indicators broke activities down by the main
stages in the value chain (production, logistics, sales, administration and overheads) and
by hierarchical level (commercial zones, workshop-regional sales management level,
factory-general sales management level, operational management level-general
management level). They did this by ensuring the coherency of indicators, measuring
them at each stage/level, and more or less aggregating them for a given period of time
and by category (daily, monthly or annual rhythms, and interrelated itemisations).
These new performance indicators could therefore legitimately replace:
- operational piloting systems being used for industrial and commercial purposes;
- support documents for budget development and control;
- the function level technical reporting systems that senior management had organised
to track production units' cement performances throughout the group.
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In any event, the approach above all had to be useful for the units and not simply consist
of a way of getting them to simply report upwards to the group level.
In an approach of this nature, the re-orientation of each unit's strategy results less from
new thinking than from the ability to improve the unit’s piloting because of the access
to new indicators. Clearly, in certain cases, this simply involves little by little providing
explanations for a strategy that already exists so as to enable its wider diffusion
throughout the organisation (harking back to the approach’s internal benchmark aspect).
4.3 The re-forecasting procedure
The fact that the same indicators could be found in different batteries does not mean that
an organisational capacity for self-coordination was being implemented. Similarly, it is
not because physical and financial indicators were included in one and the same battery
that we had now generated the ability to anticipate the interdependencies that exist
between these indicators, and the ability to make the correct decisions.
A traditional BSC approach consists of modelling interactions on the basis of a
strategic-economic model.
With the approach being adopted here and specifically because it had a footing in each
of the different operational levels, this goal was deemed unrealistic (we would have
needed an integrated model for the entire business, containing several hundred
indicators). In actual fact, we dealt with this issue by setting up shared re-forecasting
procedures.
Usually this involves regularly mobilising all of the organisation's managers for year-
end profitability re-forecasting exercises that touch upon both technical and financial
indicators. Here is a detailed example.
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4.3.1 Operational issues5
The cement workshops were organised around four main manufacturing phases:
preparation of the feed, crushing, fuel preparation, firing. A workshop manager who
reported to the factory manager ran each phase.
The person in charge of preparing fuels was supposed to be informed of any drop in the
price of coke petroleum, one of the fuels used in the firing process. Based on the data
that had been received on prices and on the various fuels’ calorific content, s/he forecast
a shift from 100 % coal to 35 % coal and 65 % coke petroleum, with the price of each
thermal unit dropping from 15FF/GJ to 8FF/GJ (1£ = ca. 11FF)6. S/he therefore
proposed a change to the factory manager who decided to follow up on this suggestion,
anticipating an overall lowering of the cost of cement (from 100FF/tonne to
80FF/tonne).
The change was supposed to be implemented. In the month that followed, variances
were noticed in the technical parameters of the factory’s daily performance indicators.
More specifically:
- the person in charge of preparing the feed noticed an increase in the consumption of
electricity and a decrease in quality,
- the person in charge of fuel preparation noticed an increase in the consumption of
electricity and in the sulphur rate,
- the person in charge of the kiln had to cope with reliability problems that lead to a
significant drop in output.
The fuel change had therefore had an unanticipated snowball effect on production,
specifically because of the need to adapt the feed, and the ensuing oven reliability
problems.
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The proposed procedure could contribute something here. This can be illustrated by
emphasising its advantages over traditional approaches.
4.3.2 Traditional systems
Each factory had traditionally been piloted by means of a (technical) checklist for each
workshop, a schedule that was updated every month during workshop manager
meetings. The management controller carried out standard analysis of variances,
basically so as to satisfy reporting requirements, but s/he did not participate in the
technical piloting meeting. The system lead to a pursuit of local technical objectives.
There was no arbitrage between the various potential actions on the basis of their
economic impact. The risk was that people would focus on whatever significant
technical variances took place, even if these variances had little economic impact - and
inversely that people would neglect minor technical variances, even if they had
significant consequences for economic performance. More specifically, the two
following scenarios had become distinct possibilities:
- Firing unit managers might have decided to restrict downtime via new investments7.
This would have been a refusal to face current realities, one that could had destroyed
the expected value of the fuel change decision. After all, such investments would
have been made with reference to a situation characterised by lower levels of
performances8.
- Or else it would have been impossible for these investments to perform as forecast
in the budget. Here the firing unit manager’s only room to manoeuvre would have
been to convince other managers to abandon the entire project - even if this meant
lower overall economic performance.
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4.3.3 The proposed system
With the proposed system, the daily performance indicators still included technical
indicators. As the month went by, local measures could be taken to keep technical
variances down.
However, at the end of the month, the factory director could ask colleagues to carry out
a re-forecasting exercise on those parameters that seemed to have been affected by the
fuel change. These re-forecasts were consolidated by the factory's management
controller and discussed at a meeting.
The re-forecasting was included in the monthly performance indicators and therefore
covered operational elements as well as their financial impact. This scenario can be
summarised as follows:
Table 1: Extracts from the battery of performance indicator
The meeting enabled discussions of how these forecasts could be collectively modified.
It concluded with the choice of a scenario that was then translated into a battery of
performance indicators for each of the various managers. This lead to the replacement
of the traditional budgetary analysis of variances (one that is undertaken by the
management controller and which is not particularly useful) by a technical-economic
piloting in which the various managers involved became aware of the way in which
their respective commitments were interacting (speed of maintenance operations, the
timing of kiln shutdowns, increasing volumes whenever another site temporarily closed,
etc.).
In this example, the issue was whether it was desirable to reduce capacities so as to cut
costs. It was certainly appropriate to present the planned scenario to the unit's general
management in order to check whether the loss of capacity would not affect forecasted
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sales, or else to determine whether there shouldn’t be a different breakdown of output
amongst the various factories. This would have been tantamount to a "re-coordination"
of action plans at the unit level (involving both the commercial and production
functions).
4.3.4 The articulation between co-ordination and incentives
The procedure we are proposing leads to a revision of local objectives. For example, if
the fuel change had been maintained, we should have seen a drop in the price of cement
but an increase in the per tonne price of the feed. If the corresponding objective had not
been revised lower, it is easy to imagine that the manager of the workshop involved
would not have adhered to the decision. And if s/he had pursued a local objective, this
could have lead to the overall failure of the fuel change decision. As such, co-ordination
is encouraged by the fact that is possible to render explicit those economic gains that
can be associated with a technical decision (hence the reasons why the local objectives
should be revised).
We can easily see how this procedure could limit incentivisation by increasing
opportunities for re-negotiation, thus encouraging people to "keep something in store"
for future bargaining. To avoid this undesired outcome, the bonus can be directly linked
to the factory's capacity for coming up with accurate forecasts of its average annual
costs. The idea is as follows: at the end of the year, a bonus is paid on the basis of an
indicator P that is devised as follows:
X(n) = (observed average annual cost - expected average annual cost in month n)_
The P indicator can be defined by:
P = n*X (n)
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The higher P is, the less the factory was able to predict its costs and therefore "pilot"
towards a controllable target. Thus the higher the P, the lower the bonus.
Our procedure encourages collective learning about the conditions in which a
performance outcome can be achieved. We are not proposing an a priori model for the
factory's performance. We are in fact replacing this sort of model with a re-forecasting
procedure that revolves around technical and economic parameters - a procedure that
encourages the emergence of a shared representation of the conditions in which the
performance can be achieved. In the above example, the re-forecasting made it possible
to highlight the need for modifying the feed following the fuel change (as well as the
consequences for the kiln's reliability).
The fact that we are reasoning from a technical-economic perspective makes it possible
to focus discussions on the interfaces that exists between the various departments, and
the commitments that have to be met (maintaining levels of sales in our example) to
reach the given target without having to develop a complete model of the factory’s
operations.
Having said that, it is clear that, in reality, the indicators will change as a result of these
many actions – all of whose impacts are interrelated. This can impede the conditions in
which learning can take place.
Having already been set up in a number of units and engendered a manifest
improvement in the predictability and control of costs, the transposition of this
procedure can be construed as a transfer of "best practices" and not as the imposition of
a cumbersome and costly procedure. In some of the units that recently adopted this idea,
it was felt that the re-forecasting aid tools could in fact serve as a means of reassuring
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operatives, both when they carry out their automatic re-forecasting of "easy" items, and
also when they try to model some of the "technical" interactions that are played out
between the various parameters. The need for modelling thus appeared ex post.
This re-forecasting procedure has been generalised to become one of the key elements
in the approach being implemented. If it follows the appropriate rhythms, the procedure
can be used for the inter-site co-ordination of production management-related issues. It
should also apply to co-ordination between Technical Departments and factories (as
regards their investment plans), etc.
4.4 Other points
This implementation experience also raised issues that the literature rarely deals with:
-  Straightforward information system issues (system interconnections) are very
important, since one is always navigating between two extremes. The approach can
be presented as if all it requires is a "paper and a pencil" (i.e., an application such as
Excel is enough to support it) - but in this case, it cannot be hooked up with existing
information systems, hence a great deal of disillusionment from operatives after a
few months of initial enthusiasm. Or else, the information system aspects can
become the "be all and end all" - but this would require a great deal more time than
that which had been initially planned, and would cause people to lose sight of the
project's managerial aspects (since different people would then be put in charge of
it).
- Training is another element that must not be neglected if the project is to succeed.
Management controllers would be the main recipients of this training as they are
destined to become the guardians of the new procedure and must therefore share in
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the new management system philosophy. However, there is also the risk that they
could one day become the principal proponents of reverting to the previous system.
-  The cumbersome nature of this type of project (one that lasts several years and
whose outcome is relatively "soft") means that if it is to succeed it must receive
constant encouragement from senior management. In our example, this stemmed
from a desire to introduce all of the ingredients of "value creation". The BSC was a
natural element for breaking this approach down at operational levels.
5. The wider picture
5.1 Reformulating the BSC approach
The proposed approach was therefore presented in the experiment we have described
above as a re-modelling of the performance indicator approach (involving an integration
of updated BSC principles) rather than as a complete overhaul of the Company's
strategy. This desire to re-model the current system clearly had to be based on an in-
depth diagnosis of existing piloting systems - a diagnosis that makes it possible to verify
and to contextualise KN’s general diagnostics system.
Once this latter system has been proven to be reliable, the first thing that needs to be
done is to merge the physical performance indicator systems with the accounting and
financial indicator-centred reporting systems. The next step is to implement a re-
forecasting procedure that can account for all of the indicators that have been selected.
This re-forecasting procedure thus replaces the idea of an a priori modelling of the
links, which exist between the technical and financial indicators. It must also enable a
more efficient achievement of the goal of improved co-ordination within the firm.
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As such, the prime motivation is the desire for higher organisational responsiveness,
rather than the innovative aspect of the BSc’s four vectors.
Above and beyond these main principles, let us now take a more detailed look at the
differences between BSC and our approach.
5.2 Three differences with the BSC
The first two differences relate to our integration of elements that are a characteristic
feature of performance indicators. The third, which is dealt with in greater length,
incorporates advances that have taken place in the field of management control.
(i) Instead of adopting a top-down approach, our approach is both top-down and
bottom-up
KN’s diagnostics rely specifically on an operational dissociation between piloting and
financial systems. They propose a complete rebuilding of these systems following a top-
down approach. Our hypothesis is that significant technical know-how is already
needed to run the existing operating systems. To benefit from this know-how, the new
performance indicator batteries will be established in a decentralised fashion, one that is
based on a diagnosis of these systems such as they already exists.
The unit's management will on the other hand have to be mobilised to deal with the
weaknesses that have already been more or less integrated into the information systems
(commercial aspects, new products, innovation, increased organisational capacities,
etc.) without any radical overhaul of the unit's strategy as such9.
This approach is supposed to avoid two types of risks. The risks of a top-down approach
relate primarily to the non-integration of operational constraints at such a time as the
strategy is first being developed10. Inversely, a purely bottom-up approach can mask
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several significant aspects because of the cognitive dissonance that exists at an
operational level.
(ii) It replaces existing reporting systems
The simultaneous incorporation of non-financial and financial indicators is not achieved
by simply adding a new system and new tracking procedure on top of existing systems
(the new strategic performance indicator battery used by the unit's senior management
and its breakdown throughout the organisation11). Quite the contrary, from the outset we
are seeking to combine financial and non-financial indicators in performance indicator
batteries that can be used in the budget procedure and for operational piloting.
This leads to the construction of an entire battery of performance indicators that are
associated with the existing organisational structure. From the very beginning and at
every level, the approach fits in with an operational piloting perspective whose purpose
is to use its inclusion of physical indicators to renew the traditional dichotomy between
financial management control/industrial operational management.
In fact, the risk with the BSC approach is that it will add one more performance
indicator system without replacing existing systems - and that it will have problems
helping the BSC to survive and prosper in the presence of so many competitor
information systems (Epstein and Manzoni, 1998).
In their latest work, KN emphasise the importance of integrating BSC into planning and
tracking procedures. They suggest ways of working towards this goal (notably through
the separation of "operational budgeting" and "strategic budgeting") without providing
any details for this integration.
The reformulation we are suggesting offers other routes that will make it possible to
avoid difficulty in trying to implement a high-performance system to help out with
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strategy decisions – even where management procedures (notably the budget procedure,
which is the cornerstone of most management control systems) are not capable of
supporting this strategy.
Integration into existing systems also makes it possible to tackle from the very start
some of the technical issues that are involved in these information systems. The
implementation approach that KN suggest does not deal with the problems of
connecting a managerial information system to transactional systems, or else to the
systems being used to carry out industrial operations. Yet only a successful connection
between such systems can render the approach operational. In fact, the changes that are
being proposed here will only be accepted or incorporated by operatives over the long
run if itemisations are coherent, the performance indicators ergonomic and the
management system user-friendly.
(iii.) Replacing the development of an a priori model with a forecasting procedure
Instead of seeking from the very beginning to build a causal model of value creation, we
try to create procedures that allow for the progressive emergence of a shared
representation of the conditions in which a certain performance can be achieved12.
Towards this end, we propose establishing a regular re-forecasting procedure that
contains annual objectives.
As opposed to a mechanistic model, our model revolves around its co-ordination
procedures. In its implementation, the procedure will of course often rely on a given
model - however the hypotheses underlying such a model will have to be shared and its
role will be restricted to the guiding of collective thinking within the confines of an
approach that is based on interactive rationality. The model becomes a support for
28
collective decision-making. Its development is greatly affected by this fact (Ponssard
and Tanguy, 1993; Ponssard, 1994).
The idea of re-forecasting is not a new one (Doblin, 1986; Chassang, 1987). It is an
attempt to respond to one recurring criticism of traditional management control systems,
which is their inclination to analyse past events (Johnson and Kaplan, 1987) in such a
way as to re-direct decisions towards the future
Having said this, by associating operational and financial indicators it becomes possible
to reason in terms of the decisions' operational dimensions whilst assessing their impact
at an economic level. By so doing, we move away from performance indicator type of
tools that basically involve operational indicator-based piloting13 to tools that are much
more forward looking like a flight simulator14. The financial indicators are no longer a
simple reflection of past performance (lag indicators), rather they are the economic
translation of actions that are being envisaged for the future (and thus involve lead
indicators)15.
In addition, the association between re-forecasting and this combination of operational
and financial elements allows us to make progress on some other management control
issues, to wit: co-ordination; incentivisation; and learning16.
Co-ordination:
Re-forecasting must provide a discussion forum for all of the operatives who are
involved in this exercise, hence an opportunity for co-ordination at the operational and
economic levels. This makes it possible, for example, to avoid local optimisation
behaviours, since the overall impact of local decisions can be demonstrated (cf., 4.3.).
Learning:
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The re-forecasting procedure, which simultaneously covers operational and financial
elements, indirectly causes operatives to demand decisional aid tools that can help them
to formalise the technical-economic relationships and interfaces which exist between the
firm's main departments. It therefore creates a basis for collective learning about the
conditions in which performance can be achieved17. This learning revolves around the
existence of a widespread type of know-how that cannot be formalised outside of the
boundaries of an action process that can be capitalised to enable greater organisational
responsiveness. Partial models are then utilised whenever the operatives themselves
request this.
The reformulation we are proposing thus offers the following advantages:
- Knowledge is progressively accumulated through a standardised procedure without
any specific project (possibly requiring the intervention of an outside consultant)
having to be set up. This makes it possible to overcome operatives' reticence (as
emphasised by Epstein and Manzoni, 1998) in providing the information that is
necessary for the development of the model18.
-  The technical and operational constraints (essentially related to the various
interfaces) will naturally be part of operatives' discussions with one another
whenever an exercise in re-forecasting takes place (i.e., production management
constraints when commercial policies change) - whereas in a "trickle-down"
performance model (such as the one found in KN's approach), it will be difficult to
integrate this type of constraint.
Nevertheless, attention should be paid to the following problems:
-  The risk of falling back into a sort of "accountant’s" management of the re-
forecasting exercise, that is, one that focuses excessively on financial indicators, and
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which therefore does not explain the links between the operational and the economic
spheres.
-  The risk of developing a re-forecasting aid model that allows the management
controller to complete the exercise all on his/her own. In this case, there would not
be any discussion between operatives, and this would rob the procedure of its real
purpose.
The piloting of the management procedure remodelling project should therefore
emphasise the quality of the re-forecasting exercises in order to ensure that they do
indeed deal with the various co-ordination issues that exist between the various centres
of responsibility - and that they do provide an opportunity for a dialogue between these
centres.
Incentivisation:
Having said this, if the re-forecasting procedure is to become functional and allow for
an integration of the re-coordination efforts, it must be understood that the local
objectives will have to be revised19. As such, there is a possibility that the existing
incentives will be weakened20. This creates a twofold challenge:
- The shared knowledge that is generated by the re-forecasting exercises will allow a
hierarchical superior to better assess the relevancy of the new objectives that are
being calculated, thereby limiting the re-negotiation possibilities that informational
asymmetry causes21.
- The lesser incentivisation will have to be offset by the positive effects of the co-
ordination.
The proposed approach thus combines easily with an approach that is also supposed to
renovate the remuneration system. In actual fact, because of its decentralised and
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interactive character, the approach makes it possible to highlight the key indicators
around which the incentives can be defined (and monitored!) at a later juncture – and
this at every level of the organisation22. In a French context, with its lesser monetary
incentives, our system fits in with a re-orientation towards more forceful incentives
systems. The re-negotiation possibilities will progressively get managers who aren't
used to taking risks to do so.
The aforementioned objectives of this re-forecasting exercise again show how important
it is to integrate these new tools into any budget procedure during which action plans
are being discussed and co-ordinated. They also demonstrate the usefulness of a bottom-
up approach.
Finally, and to include long-term issues in this study23, it would certainly be a good idea
to extend these performance indicator and re-forecasting principles into the planning
process, since this would make it possible to shift from a one-year time frame to a
strategic horizon. This would not only involve an extension of the forecasts' horizon - it
would allow for the design of performance indicators that represent real issues24.
Above and beyond these three differences, note that the reformulation being proposed
here seems to be well adapted to multidivisional companies that are trying to set up
relatively uniform systems across all divisions that basically have the same core
business (and which therefore lend themselves to natural inter-unit benchmarking). In
this situation, it is difficult to focus on one pilot unit and then generalise on this basis - it
is preferable to benefit from different units' experiences and then to synthesise them.
Here the approach can be decentralised from the beginning and the focus oriented
towards shared operational aspects instead of towards the specific aspects of a given
unit's strategy. In addition, the benchmarking argument helps convey the idea (which
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operatives may dislike at first) that the performance indicators may be initially
standardised, to a certain extent at least.
Moreover, this reformulation is well adapted to a context in which no strategic novelties
are expected in the short run25.
All in all, the reformulation being proposed here seems particularly well adapted to the
situation in which a number of firms who are currently thinking about BSC find
themselves. This is because it involves an improvement of operational management
rather than a radical redefinition of the entire piloting system.
Lastly, the reformulation can be a complete one insofar as it can draw inspiration from
the BSC, given that it systematically takes into account the four dimensions which KN
(or anyone else, c.f., Epstein and Manzoni, 1998) apply to all performance indicators.
6. Conclusion
BSC's contribution is probably that through its combination of financial and non-
financial indicators, it has introduced, in a current environment that is largely dominated
by incentivisation, a number of long-term, co-ordination-related elements and learning
elements, though limited to top management. Having said that, this has been
accompanied by the abandonment of individual incentives the further we go down the
hierarchical ladder, meaning that BSC does not address the issue of simultaneously
resolving both co-ordination, collective learning and individual incentives. To better
understand and resolve the issues that are associated with this question, we have tried to
add to current thinking on BSC by presenting new ways of implementing the models of
cause and effects which are at the heart of BSC. These paths are based on three
principles:
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- Models must be thought of as tools of dialogue (Ponssard and Tanguy, 1993). This
means that information exchanges during re-forecasting phases are more important
than a simple corroboration of the forecasts - and that outcome-tracking procedures
must emphasise the lateral and vertical exchanges that are involved in operational
information.
- Information exchanges go with reduced incentivisation. This has to be offset.
- The tools must encourage the emergence of a model that links operational issues and
financial performance so as to render decisions more observable and subsequently
limits the weakening of incentivisation.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Extracts from the battery of performance indicator
Initial
situation
Forecast  made
dur ing  i n i t i a l
decision
Re-forecast
Fuel preparation
Consumption of electricity KWh/t 10 10 15
Cost of fuel/GJ F/GJ 15 8 9
Preparation of feed
KFUI* % 10 10 15
Output t feed/month 50 000 50 000 47 000
Cost of feed FF/t 14 14 15
Firing unit (kiln)
Efficiency of equipment % 70 70 50
Output T clinker/mo. 32 000 32 000 28 000
Cost of firing F/t clinker 60 40 50
Factory
Output T cement/mo. 40 000 40 000 35 000
Cost of cement F/t cement 100 80 90
*Kiln Feed Uniformity Index
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1 Kaplan and Norton (1992) - the first in a series of three articles (KN, 1993; KN 1996a)
2 The usual French translation is a “prospective tableau de bord [battery of performance indicators]”.
3 See Aoki (1986) in particular.
4 cf. KN (1996b, p.8): “objectives and measures for the Balanced Scorecard [...] are derived from a top-
down process driven by the mission and strategy of the business unit” and the title of Chapter 9
“Achieving Strategic Alignment: From Top to Bottom”.
i See for instance the examples of City of Charlotte or UPS (KN, 2001).
5 The present case expands upon a real experience, one which took place within the framework of an aid
mission involving an implementation of new batteries of performance indicators. It is part of a teaching
module that is intended to illustrate the system’s anticipated effects on the heads of technical departments
and on factory managers.
6 For reasons of confidentiality, the data is fictitious. The basic trends have been shown here.
7 Although a return to the level of performance forecast in the budget is impossible in the absence of any
investment (c.f., re-forecasting within the framework of the new system).
8 This explains why it is impossible to use the (ex post) ROI to find the average (ex ante) IRR of the
unit’s successive investment programmes.
9Many of the methods envisaged for implementing a tableau de bord battery of performance indicators
also try to combine top-down approaches (i.e., as regards the definition of objectives) with bottom-up
ones (since the key indicators that make it possible to reach the defined targets are defined by the
managers).
10 This risk is particularly great in the highly industrialised firms where KN’s diagnostics can be applied –
in which case it is difficult to devise the type of performance model that can support a BSC. Inversely,
this model may well be easier to develop wherever operational constraints are less stringent (i.e., in an
insurance company). But KN’s diagnostic is less relevant in this case.
11 The BSC approach’s limited usability for General Management is also highlighted by Chiapello and
Lebas (1996) and Mendoza (1998, p.57). The same breakdown methodology is also mentioned (KN,
1996b, p.8) – but it is never described.
12 Several authors (Epstein and Manzoni, 1998; Chiapello and Lebas, 1996) focus on the fact that the
model’s development phase is just as important as its utilisation phase. This analysis can be extended by
highlighting the conditions in which the model was actually devised, or more specifically, the existence of
shared knowledge.
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13 Yet even if financial indicators are nothing more than the translation of past actions, physical indicators
are not indicators of economic performance per se. Hence the need to try to control operational indicators
by coming up with hypotheses regarding the operational objectives’ impact on financial performance.
14 Thus remaining in line with the principles that KN listed (1996b, p.30).
15 It is not always easy to measure the economic impact of a given decision. More specifically, it is no
easy thing to measure the economic impact on a product’s development cycle or customer satisfaction
rates. It remains that we find it wrong that decisions be made on these topics without any attention being
paid to their economic impact. The procedure we are suggesting here attempts to explain the hypotheses
underlying such decisions without making any judgements as to the feasibility of quantifying their
financial impact with any degree of precision.
16 These issues are explicit in Anthony’s definition of management control (1989) as a “process by which
managers influence other members of the organisation so that they will implement its strategy”.
17 Here we concur with recent studies that have simultaneously stressed the importance of technico-
economic modelling as well as the way in which the learning which occurs during the management
systems’ design (Argyris and Schön, 1978; Hatchuel and Weil, 1990) leads to a rejuvenation of
prospective management systems (Midler, 1994; Ponssard and Tanguy, 1993; Soler and Tanguy, 1998;
Saulpic and Tanguy, 2001).
18 This information was a source of power for them (Crozier and Friedberg, 1977).
19 This point will be illustrated in Chapter 4.3.4.
20 The loss of incentives may stem from what the theory of contracts calls the “ratchet effect”
(Dewatripont, 1989), the result of a hierarchical superior’s temptation to revise a target upwards when
s/he realises that the initial objective was too easy. It is also the result of a “hold-up”, corresponding to
situations where the possibility of renegotiating objectives induces actors to work less hard on a task that
will only provide results if the actors continue to operate within the framework of their current function or
firm.
21 Another direction consists of agreeing to incorporate co-ordination tasks into performance evaluation.
Work on the theory of contracts studying the effects on the incentive system of having agents accomplish
a multiplicity of tasks (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991) suggests that an audit procedure be used towards
this end. Sinclair Desgagné (1999) demonstrates how it is possible to achieve a high degree of
simultaneous incentivisation from a task whose outcome can be measured (i.e., output) and from a task
whose outcome is difficult to measure (i.e., quality). This requires establishing monetary incentives for
quantities; initiating a quality audit if the quantities exceed a certain threshold; reinforcing the incentive
system if the audit is positive; and cancelling bonuses if the audit is negative. If we hypothesise that the
difficulties in giving people an incentive to co-ordinate stem from the problems that are involved in
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measuring the results of this action, the target here is to turn co-ordination into something that can be
audited. A model that links operational issues and financial performance helps us to advance in this
direction.
22 As we have stressed, KN only deal with the issue of incentives in an indirect manner. Our
reformulation is in tune with their thinking as regards the need to define incentives only after having
highlighted the problems of co-ordination.
23 This being one of the objectives of the BSC.
24 For an illustration see Tanguy (1989).
25 Having said that, even where such a break can be envisaged, the existence of a shared representation of
the conditions in which a given level of performance can be achieved “from bottom up” might make it
possible to validate the feasibility of a strategic reorientation that is based on “top down” strategic
thinking. This can be done by introducing technical and operational constraints into this reorientation
(Tanguy, 1989).
